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1. Introduction 
The “gift exchange” approach in labor relations (Akerlof 1982; Summers 1988; Akerlof and 
Yellen 1990) has recently found some strong experimental support (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, Riedl 
1993; Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold, and Gächter 1998; Gächter and Falk 2002). Labor relations 
in these experiments are modeled such that the employer can choose to pay a wage above the 
minimum level hoping for the worker’s reciprocity. The worker can then choose to exert an 
effort level above the minimum. The principle finding in these studies is that a vast majority 
of  the  experimental  employers  “trust”  their  workers  by  paying  wages  well  above  the 
minimum level. In response, a majority of the experimental workers “reciprocate”, i.e. they 
exert the more work effort, the greater the wage is that they receive. The consequence of this 
high degree of trust and reciprocity is that efficiency is much higher than in the equilibrium of 
the game with money-maximizing rational agents. 
So far, the experimental research on the topic has concentrated on environments in which both 
employers and workers have complete information on the costs and benefits. In some labor 
relations,  however,  the  assumption  of  symmetric  and  complete  payoff  information  seems 
empirically too strong. Sometimes workers may have some general knowledge of the positive 
correlation between their work effort and the surplus of the employer (i.e. the firm), but may 
not be able to quantify the actual marginal effect of work effort on the employer’s payoff. An 
office secretary, for example, who increases his
1 effort by doubling the number of chores he 
completes in a day, generally, will not know the exact amount of additional surplus created 
for  the  firm  owners.
2  Not  only  the  workers,  but  also  the  employer  may  have  incomplete 
information on the surplus effect of workers’ increased work effort. This is especially true 
                                                           
1 For simplicity, we will always refer to the employer in female gender and to the worker in male gender. 
2 We thank Reinhard Selten for pointing out this example.  
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when the job is concerned with administrative tasks or when the business success is stochastic 
to some extent. It is quite conceivable, for example, that the employer of the secretary can 
measure the payoff effect of his increased effort only ex post, but not ex ante.
3  
In this paper, we study labor relations with symmetric incomplete and asymmetric incomplete 
surplus information. Our model is based on the “bilateral gift exchange” game presented by 
Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold, and Gächter (1998 – abbreviated as FKWG from now on). In that 
game, the employer makes a wage offer to the worker, who can accept or reject the contract. 
If the contract is accepted the worker chooses some work effort level. The employer’s payoff 
increases at a constant marginal rate with an increase in the worker’s effort. There is complete 
information concerning the surplus, since all costs and benefits of the employer and of the 
worker are known to both parties.  
We  consider  two  incomplete  information  variants  of  the  basic  symmetric  complete 
information  game  by  FKWG.  In  both  of  our  incomplete  information  games,  the  constant 
marginal effect of work effort on the employer’s surplus is a random variable that can either 
take  a  high  or  a  low  positive  value,  each  equally  likely.  In  the  symmetric  incomplete 
information game, neither employers nor workers are informed on the outcome of the random 
draw before making their decisions. In the asymmetric information game, the employer is 
informed on the realization of the random variable, while the worker is not. 
There are several reasons to believe that the informational setup may affect behavior in labor 
relations. First, there is evidence that behavior may be significantly different when comparing 
the symmetric complete information and the asymmetric incomplete information of a simple 
game, even when the game theoretic predictions are the same (Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan 
                                                           
3 The secretary’s hard work, for example, may create a greater marginal surplus in extremely busy times than in 
relatively quiet periods.  
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1979; Roth and Murnighan 1982; Mitzkewitz and Nagel 1993, Irlenbusch and Sliwka 2003). 
Second,  there  are  some  clues  that  the  puzzling  discrepancy  in  the  results  of  two  recent 
experimental  papers  studying  workers’  real  effort  reciprocity  may  be  explained  by  the 
difference in the information that was available to the subjects. In a real effort laboratory 
experiment, Gneezy (2003) lets some subjects (employers) pay other subjects (workers) lump-
sum wages to solve mazes on the computer. He finds clear evidence of greater work effort on 
the part of the workers who are paid higher wages. It is important to note that the workers in 
this experiment were fully informed on the exact dollar value of an increase of their work 
effort for the employer. In contrast, Hennig-Schmidt, Rockenbach, and Sadrieh (2003) report 
a field experiment in which typists who are paid hourly wages are given no exact information 
on the benefit structure of their employer. While the authors find no evidence for work effort 
reciprocity in the original no information setting, they do find support for the presence of 
positive effort reciprocity in a follow-up experiment with increased information.   
We find strong support for the conjecture that the informational setting affects behavior in 
contractual relations that rely on trust and reciprocity. Trust and reciprocity are also present 
under incomplete payoff information, but they are both substantially reduced. The wage offers 
chosen by the employers and the effort levels chosen by the workers are substantially lower 
than in the case with complete information. The negative impact of incomplete information on 
wage offers is especially strong in the setting with asymmetric incomplete information. In this 
treatment, we find that employers with a high marginal benefit from work effort mimic the 
behavior of those with a low marginal benefit, by making especially low wage offers. The 
significantly lower wages they offer lead to significantly lower payoffs for employers and 
workers,  even  though  workers’  reciprocity  is  not  different  from  reciprocity  in  the  other 
treatments.  We  conclude  that  reducing  the  incompleteness  and  asymmetry  of  payoff 
information  in  relationships  that  rely  on  trust  and  reciprocity  (such  as  employer-worker  
4
relations) is to the benefit of both employers and workers, because it enhances efficiency and 
leads to mutual gains that can be shared by the two parties making them both better off. 
2. Game and experimental setup 
We  study  two  incomplete  information  variations  of  the  “bilateral  gift  exchange”  game 
introduced by FKWG. In this game, the employer makes a wage offer w to the worker, who 
may accept or reject this offer. If the worker rejects, he receives an unemployment benefit c0 
and the employer receives nothing. In case the worker accepts the wage offer, he must choose 
a work effort e. Effort is costly for the worker and beneficial for the employer. The payoffs in 
case of an accepted wage offer are: 
employer = (víZÂH 
worker = wíFH 
where v represents an exogenously given redemption value and c(e) represents the strictly 
increasing cost of effort e.  
We modify the game by introducing incomplete information about the marginal benefit of the 
worker’s effort for the employer’s payoff. This is modeled by inserting the employer profit 
factor (EPF) f into the employer’s payoff function 
employer = (víZÂHÂI 
The parameter f is the realization of a random variable that can take either a high or a low 
value. A high value of f resembles a high marginal benefit of the worker’s effort for the 
employer’s  payoff  and  vice  versa.  In  this  way,  we  generalize  the  original  model  without 
losing  the  feature  of  a  constant  marginal  benefit  of  effort.  Furthermore,  our  modification 
leaves the worker’s profit function unchanged.   
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The  base  game  of  FKWG  can  be  represented  as  a  parameterization  of  our  game  with 
symmetric complete information (SC), where f is equal to 1 with probability 1. We study the 
game with symmetric incomplete information (SI) as well as with asymmetric incomplete 
information (ASI). In the symmetric case, neither the employer nor the worker is informed 
about the realization of the employer profit factor f, while in the asymmetric case only the 
employer knows the value of f.  
The  game  theoretic  analyses  (applying  the  subgame  perfect  equilibrium  concept  to  the 
complete information game and the sequential equilibrium concept to the modified games) 
yield  the  same  predictions:  The  worker  accepts any wage offered and exerts the minimal 
effort, while the employer offers the minimal wage. To allow direct numerical comparisons of 
our results to those of FKWG, we use exactly the same game parameters, with v=120, c0=20, 
and c(e) as shown in table 1.  
Table 1 – Effort costs 
effort e  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0 
effort cost c(e)  0  1  2  4  6  8  10  12  15  18 
 
To avoid excessive losses and to achieve the minimal participation requirements, wages had 
to  be  in  the  range  between  the  redemption  value  and  the  unemployment  benefit.  In  the 
incomplete information games, the employer profit factor could either take the value f=0.5 or 
f=1.5,  where  both  were  equally  likely.  Thus,  the  expected  value  of  f  in  the  incomplete 
information treatments equals the value of f in the base game. 
We use the same matching procedure as FKWG. There were twenty subjects in each session, 
with  ten  subjects  randomly  assigned  to  the  role  of  the  employer  and  the  remaining  ten 
subjects assigned to the role of the worker. Each subject played ten rounds of the game, all 
rounds in the same role (employer or worker). Subjects were matched using a revolving (or  
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round-robin) matching scheme, such that each employer met each worker only once and vice 
versa (Kamecke 1997).
4 The employer profit factor was randomly and independently drawn at 
the beginning of each round and the incomplete information was resolved at the end of each 
round by announcing f.  
We  conducted  4  sessions  of  the  SI  treatment  and  3  sessions  of  the  ASI  treatment.  Each 
session is one independent observation. Our non-parametric tests are based on the session 
data. Table 2 summarizes the parameters of the original FKWG treatment SC and our two 
treatments with symmetric SI and asymmetric ASI incomplete information. 
Table 2 – Experimental treatments 
treatment 
abbreviation  treatment name 
information on 
employer surplus is 
known to 









both employer and 











employer only  28  3 
*) The SC treatment is part of the experiment by FKWG and is abbreviated “BGE” in that paper. We report it 
here, because we use it as the complete information control for our treatments. 
 
All our sessions were conducted at the Erfurt Laboratory for Experimental Economics (elab) 
at the University of Erfurt. The communication was computerized with software based on  
zTree  (Fischbacher  1999).  The  subjects  were  seated  in  cubicles  and  received  written 
instructions  (see  the  appendix).  With  the  exception  of  the  necessary  modifications,  the 
instructions were identical to the original instructions by FKWG. After the instructions were 
read aloud, any remaining questions of the subjects were answered privately at the cubicle. 
                                                           
4 In three sessions only 18 subjects were present. The played 9 consecutive rounds in the revolving scheme.   
7
The sessions lasted approximately one hour and the subjects, on average, earned Euro 10, a 
little more than $10.
5 
3. Results 
In the following, we analyze in which ways the interaction between employers and workers is 
affected when the information conditions are varied. The data of the SC treatment that we 
incorporate in our analysis were collected and reported by FKWG. The main result on the SC 
treatment in that paper is that employers generally offer wages well above the minimal wage 
and that many workers reciprocate by choosing work effort above the minimal level. Hence, 
the  observed  behavior  in  the  “bilateral  gift  exchange”  of  the  SC  treatment  leads  to 
substantially more efficient outcomes than predicted by theory.  
3.1 Wage offers (Trust) 
We begin our evaluation with the analysis of wage offers. We observe that, in all treatments, 
the vast majority of wage offers exceeds the minimum wage by more than one point.
6 In SC, 
only 9 of 391 wage offers were smaller or equal to the minimum wage plus one. In SI, the 
count was 3 of 261 and, in ASI, it was 12 of 381. It seems clear, that employers do not follow 
the strict logic of money maximization with sequential rationality. Instead, they are willing to 
pay substantially more than the minimum wage. The average wage offer in SC is 59.9, in SI it 
is 55.5, and in ASI it is 46.1.  
                                                           
5 Since the FKWG experiment was run with paper and pencil, the average duration of the SC sessions were 
about two hours at an hourly payment of ca. $17. 
6 From a game theoretic point of view, it makes sense to check for wage offers either equal to the minimum 
wage of 20 or equal to the minimum wage plus one (i.e. 21), because each of these two can be part of an 
equilibrium. Some authors argue that the latter equilibrium may be more robust than the former, in which one of 
the players (the worker) is indifferent between playing the equilibrium strategy (i.e. accepting any wage offer 
greater or equals 20) and playing other out-of-equilibrium strategies (Mitzkewitz and Nagel 1993).   
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Figure 1 shows the development of average wage offers in the three treatments. It seems that 
the average wage offers are different across treatments from the beginning and stay different, 
since they are almost unchanged over time. The average wage offer in the ASI treatment lies 
well below the average wage offers in the two symmetric information treatments in every 
single  period  of  the  game.  In  fact,  testing  non-parametrically  for  statistical  differences 
between the treatments, we find that the average wage offers in ASI are significantly lower 
than  in  SC  and  SI  (Mann-Whitney  U-test,  p=.029  and  p=.057,  respectively),  while  no 
statistically significant difference can be found between the average wage offers in the two 
treatments with symmetric information. The comparison of the average accepted wages across 
treatments yield the same results at the same significance levels. 
Figure 1 – Development of average wage offers over time 
 
Even  though  the  non-parametric  tests  pick  up  no  statistical  differences  between  the  two 
symmetric treatments SC and SI, a comparison of the cumulative distribution of wage offers, 
shown  in  figure  2,  suggests  that  there  may  be  a  slight  difference  between  the  symmetric 
complete information and the symmetric incomplete information treatments. The cumulative 
distribution of wage offers in SI lies to the left of the distribution in SC for all but the lowest 
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wage interval. Clearly, the difference is not as strong as it is between ASI and SC, but it is 
perhaps strong enough to emerge from less conservative statistical procedures than the non-
parametric tests that we have applied so far. 
Figure 2 – Cumulative distribution of wage offers. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results of a regression analysis with wage offers as the dependent 
variable. We use the SC treatment as a baseline and add two dummy variables for the SI and 
the ASI treatments. In addition, we include a variable (ASIxEPF) that captures the effect of 
the information on the employer profit factor that is available to the employers in the ASI 
treatment. This variable is not relevant in the SC and the SI treatments, because in the former 
the EPF is always equal to one, while in the latter it’s realization is unknown to the employer 
at decision time. 
The main result is that both treatment dummy coefficients are negative and highly significant, 
indicating that employers in both of the incomplete information treatments SI and ASI offer 
lower wages than in the complete information treatment SC. But, note that the negative effect 
of information incompleteness on wage offers is much stronger in the asymmetric case (ASI) 
than  it  is  in  the  symmetric  case  (SI),  even  when  we  take  the  positive  coefficient  of  the 
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ASIxEPF variable into account. This positive coefficient implies that employers in the ASI 
treatment use the information on the realization of the stochastic term in their payoff function, 
on average making a 6.7 point higher wage offer when the marginal benefit of work effort is 
high. But even the wage offers by the high benefit employers in ASI are substantially lower 
than the wage offers in the two symmetric treatments.
7  
Table 3 – Tobit regression of wage offers 
  coefficient  std. error  t  P > |t|  [95% conf. interval] 
period  .4067754  .2135204  1.91  0.057  -.012212  .8257629 
SI-dummy  -4.095764  1.540773  -2.66  0.008  -7.119196  -1.072331 
ASI-dummy  -20.72198  2.413191  -8.59  0.000  -25.45734  -15.98662 
ASIxEPF  6.674693  1.973072  3.38  0.001  2.802967  10.54642 
constant  57.58001  1.515837  37.99  0.000  54.6055  60.55451 
Notes: 2-sided censored Tobit regression with wage offers as the dependent variable. SC is the base treatment, 
SI-dummy and ASI-dummy are dummy variables for the SI and ASI treatments, respectively. In the SI and 
ASI treatments, the employer profit factor EPF takes one of the values .5 or 1.5 for employers with a low or a 
high marginal benefit from work effort, respectively. We regress wage offers on the EPF only in the ASI 
treatment (i.e. ASIxEPF), because only here the realization of the EPF is know to the employers at decision 
time. The regression is based on 1028 observations. 
 
Finally,  notice  that  the  regression  also  provides  some  (rather  weak)  evidence  on  a  slight 
increase of wage offers over time. The decision period’s coefficient is positive and weakly 
significant, but only a small fraction of the value of coefficients of the treatment dummies. 
The regression suggests that wage offers, on average, increase by about four points over the 
ten rounds. Since our workers exhibit strong reciprocity (as shown in the next subsection), the 
increase in wages over time may be due to learning on part of the employers who receive 
positive feedback in response to high wages. 
                                                           
7 We also ran tobit regressions correcting for the dependencies in our data set. The results we report here are also 
supported by those regressions. The estimated error probability on the coefficient of the SI-dummy, however, 
increases slightly above the significance level we apply here.  
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Result  1  (Wage  offers  and  accepted  wages)  Wage  offers  in  the  asymmetric  incomplete 
information  treatment  ASI  are  significantly  smaller  than  in  both  symmetric  information 
treatments SC and SI. Wage offers in the symmetric incomplete information treatment SI also 
seem  to  be  smaller  than  in  the  symmetric  complete  information  treatment  SC,  but  not 
significantly so when applying the non-parametric tests. The corresponding results also hold 
for accepted wage offers. 
3.2. Work effort (Reciprocity) 
In the last section, we found that the employers offer to pay wages well above the minimum 
wage. This behavior can only be sensible, if an employer expects the worker to reciprocate to 
high wage offers by choosing higher than minimum work effort.
8 To check whether workers 
behave reciprocal or behave money maximizing (i.e. choose the minimum work effort at any 
wage), we plot the average observed work effort against seven wage brackets in Figure 3.
9 
Figure 3 clearly shows that there is a positive correlation between the observed work effort 
and the wage in all three treatments. The relationship between wage and work effort seems to 
be almost linear in the symmetric complete information case, perhaps slightly “flattening out” 
for the very high wages. In the two incomplete information treatments the relationship is not 
completely  monotonic,  but  all  in  all  quite  similar  to  the  complete  information  case.  It  is 
interesting to note, however, that there is no wage interval, in which the observed average 
work effort in SC is smaller than in either of the incomplete information settings.  
                                                           
8 Note that not even a preference for equal payoffs can induce the employer to offer a wage above the minimum, 
if the worker is a money maximizer. Since a money maximizing worker chooses the minimum effort at any wage 
greater or equal to the minimum wage, the employer confronted with this worker receives the maximum payoff 
by offering him the minimum wage. But, since even the employer’s maximum is far below the worker’s payoff 
in that outcome, paying a higher wage only increases the inequality of payoffs. 
9 For the sake of comparability, we plot the same wage brackets as used by FKWG.  
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Figure 3 – Effort to Wage Relation 
 
Although our non-parametric tests do not find a statistical difference when comparing session 
averages across treatments, Figure 3 seems to indicate that aggregate reciprocity (i.e. average 
work effort per unit of wage) is higher when the surplus information is complete than when it 
is uncertain. This impression is supported by Figure 4 that shows the average ratio of work 
effort to wage. In the symmetric complete information treatment SC, each unit more in wage 
results in an increase of work effort by an average of 0.0059 effort units. The employer’s 
“best bargain” is at wages between 41 and 70 that return more than 0.0060 effort units per 
unit of wage. In contrast, the average increase of work effort per unit of wage is only about 
0.0050 in both incomplete information treatments, with the ratio going over 0.0060 just for a 
small range of wages in each treatment (for 51-60 in SI and for 61-70 in ASI). 
To have a clearer picture of the determinants of workers’ effort choices table 4 summarizes 
the results of a regression with work effort as the dependent variable. As in the previous 
regression, we use the SC treatment as a baseline, add two dummy variables for the SI and the 
ASI treatments, and include the period variable to check for dynamic effects. Since the graphs 
show strong evidence for reciprocal behavior, it comes as no surprise that the coefficient of 
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the wage offer is positive and highly significant. In fact, the estimated coefficient is exactly in 
the range that we expected when looking at figure 4. For each unit more wage the workers 
provide  roughly  0.0054  more units of work effort. Thus, our regression strongly favors a 
model of reciprocal behavior over the model of money maximizing behavior, in which effort 
choices are invariant to the wage. The level of reciprocity, however, drops substantially with 
the introduction of incomplete information. Both treatment dummy coefficients are negative 
and highly significant. But, since the two coefficients are almost equal, we must conclude that 
information asymmetry in the ASI treatment does not have an additional negative effect on 
the work effort as it does on the wage offers. 
Figure 4 – Work Effort per Unit of Wage 
 
So far we have only established workers’ reciprocal behavior in the aggregate. An obvious 
question is to which extent we can find reciprocal responses of individual workers. To analyze 
behavior on the individual level, we calculate Spearman rank correlation coefficients between 
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wages  and  effort  choices  of  each  worker  separately.
10  We  then  distinguish  three  types  of 
workers. (1) The “money maximizers” are workers who choose the minimum effort level in 
all rounds. (2) The “reciprocators” are workers with a positive rank correlation coefficient 
between wage and effort that is significant at 10%. (3) The “others” are workers who do not 
belong to the first two categories. Table 5 summarizes the result of the correlation analysis.  
Table 4 – Tobit regression of work effort 
  coefficient  std. error  t  P > |t|  [95% conf. interval] 
wage offer  .0053562  .0003951  13.56  0.000  .0045809  .0061315 
period  -.0031303  .0025645  -1.22  0.223  -.008163  .0019023 
SI-dummy  -.0510275  .0186645  -2.73  0.006  -.0876558  -.0143992 
ASI-dummy  -.0481782  .0176639  -2.73  0.006  -.082843  -.0135135 
constant  .0527794  .0297893  1.77  0.077  -.0056808  .1112397 
Notes: 2-sided censored Tobit regression with work effort as the dependent variable. SC is the base treatment, 
SI-dummy and ASI-dummy are dummy variables for the SI and ASI treatments, respectively. The regression 
is based on 956 observations. 
 
The majority of workers in each treatment are the reciprocators, while the money maximizers 
typically  constitute  the  smallest  group.  Although  the  asymmetric  incomplete  information 
treatment ASI exhibits the smallest relative frequency of reciprocators (54%) and the greatest 
relative frequency of money maximizers (23%), the treatment differences are not statistically 
significant. Furthermore, since we find the greatest relative frequency of reciprocators in the 
symmetric incomplete information treatment SI (71%), we conclude that the informational 
setup does not influence the number of reciprocal workers, but the degree of their reciprocity. 
Result  2  (Wage  Effort  Relation)  The  majority  of  workers  in  all  three  treatments  exhibit 
reciprocal behavior. The degree of reciprocity is higher with complete information (SC) than 
without (SI and ASI). Information asymmetry has no additional negative effect on reciprocity. 
                                                           
10 This coefficient takes a value between –1 and +1, where –1 indicates that the sorting of the two analyzed data 
series are perfectly negatively correlated, 0 indicates no correlation, and +1 perfect positive correlation. The 
coefficient is “significant at x%,” if the (one-tailed) probability of it being zero is smaller or equal to x%.  
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Table 5 – Worker types       
  SC  SI  ASI 
Money maximizers  
(choose minimal effort in all rounds)  5 (12.5%)  3 (10.7%)  9 (23.1%) 
Reciprocators  
(positive rank correlation coefficient, significant at 10%)  24 (60.0%)  20 (71.4%)  21 (53.8%) 
Others  11 (27.5%)  5 (17.9%)  9 (23.1%) 
Total  40  28  39 
 
3.3. Payoffs and Efficiency 
Figures 5 shows the distribution of income over wage and the overall average income in each 
of the three treatments. The dark part of each bar in the figure represents the average income 
of the employer and the light part the average income of the worker. The fact that the sum of 
the two payoffs increases monotonically with the wage in all three treatments is evidence for 
the positive impact of trust and reciprocity on efficiency. The higher the wage paid by the 
employer, the more effort is exerted by the worker, and the greater is the joint income. Hence, 
the  combination  of  employers’  trust  and  workers’  reciprocal  behavior  leads  to  enormous 
efficiency gains in all our experimental economies.  
The overall average income bars in the lower right panel of the figure indicate, however, that 
the efficiency gains are smaller in the incomplete information treatments than in the complete 
information treatment SC. This is the case with incomplete information, not only because the 
reciprocal response of workers is weaker, but also because the employers offer lower wages. 
Since the second effect is substantially stronger in the asymmetric ASI treatment than in the 
symmetric incomplete information treatment SI, the loss of efficiency in ASI is significantly 
greater than in SC and SI. The Mann-Whitney U-test applied to the session averages returns 
significant  differences  between  SC  and  ASI  as  well  as  between  SI  and  ASI  (p=.023  and 
p=.057, one-tailed, respectively), no significant difference is picked up between SC and SI.  
16
Summarizing, it seems that incomplete information is harmful for the efficiency of trade in 
these markets and asymmetric information is even worse. 
Figures 5 – Income distribution 
 
The additional information that employers in ASI have, when compared to those in SI, not 
only harms the efficiency of trade, but it also decreases the employers’ average income, which 
ranges between 17.9 in SC and 16.4 in SI, but is down to 14.9 in ASI. The variation across 
sessions  (i.e.  independent  observations),  however,  is  so  high  that  none  of  the  differences 
prove significant using non-parametric tests. But, since the majority of observed wage offers 
in SI and ASI are well below the wage that provides the maximum payoff in the inverse 
U-shaped distribution of employer income in figure 5, it seems clear that employers earn 
substantially less than they could, if they would offer higher wages in these treatments. 
Result 3 (Efficiency) Efficiency of trade in ASI (with asymmetric incomplete information) is 
significantly  smaller  than  the  efficiency  in  SC  and  SI.  Average  efficiency  in  SI  (with 
symmetric incomplete information) is lower than in SC, but the difference is not statistically 

































































significant. Similarly, average employer income drops going from SC to SI and to ASI, but 
the differences are not statistically significant.  
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
The experimental research on gift-exchange in labor markets with non-verifiable effort has 
concentrated on the case in which both employers and workers are fully informed on the 
surplus  that  is  created  through  their  interaction.  In  these  complete  information  settings, 
employers’  trust  (i.e.  the  voluntary  payment  of  higher  than minimal wages) and workers’ 
reciprocity (i.e. the voluntary provision of effort above the minimum level) have been found 
to  be  very  high  and  robust,  leading  to  substantial  efficiency gains when compared to the 
equilibrium prediction. But, such high levels of trust and reciprocity may be especially easy to 
attain in a world where all payoff information is readily at hand and the fairness of the payoff 
distribution is verifiable. The question that we address in this paper is whether and in which 
way the lack of complete information affects the level of trust and reciprocity in relationships 
governed by voluntary “gift exchange”. 
We examine two incomplete information settings. In both cases, we model the employer’s 
payoff to be a function of the work effort, the wage, and of a stochastic term. In one case, the 
asymmetric incomplete information treatment, the employer is informed on the realization of 
the  stochastic  term,  but  the  worker  is  not.  In  the  other  case,  the  symmetric  incomplete 
information treatment, neither the employer nor the worker are informed on the realization of 
the stochastic term when they make their decisions.  
We  compare  the  data  from  our  two  experimental  treatments  with  the  data  from  the 
corresponding  complete  information  treatment  that  was  experimented  by  Fehr,  Kirchler, 
Weichbold, and Gächter (1998). Our results are surprisingly clear. On the one hand, trust and 
reciprocity prove to be robust behavioral phenomenon in labor relations with non-verifiable  
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work effort, even in the presence of information incompleteness and asymmetry. Wage offers, 
effort levels, and efficiency in both of our incomplete information settings are significantly 
greater than predicted in the game theoretic equilibrium with payoff maximizing agents. On 
the other hand, information incompleteness has a negative impact on trust and reciprocity. 
Wage offers, effort levels, and efficiency in both of our incomplete information settings are 
substantially  lower  than  in  the  complete  information  baseline.  The  damaging  effect  of 
information incompleteness on trust is especially dramatic in the asymmetric treatment, in 
which the employer is fully informed, but the worker is uncertain about the surplus that his 
work effort generates. Wage offers in the asymmetric case are significantly lower than in any 
other treatment, leading to significantly lower efficiency levels than in the other treatments.  
Surprisingly, there is no comparable negative impact of the information asymmetry on the 
workers’ reciprocity. This means that, for any given wage, the average work effort in both 
incomplete information treatments is almost the same. But, if the workers’ reciprocity is not 
lower  in  the  asymmetric  case,  then  why  do  the  employers  make  lower  wage  offers?  We 
suggest the following answer. While employers in the asymmetric information treatment are 
perfectly informed whether their matched worker provides them with a high or a low marginal 
benefit (i.e. whether the realization of the stochastic term in their payoff function is high or 
low), employers in the symmetric incomplete information treatment only know the expected 
marginal benefit of effort, which is exactly midway between the high and the low case. One 
might expect that informed high (low) benefit employers will pay wages higher (lower) than 
the uninformed employers facing a risk. But, instead of this separation, we observe that the 
high benefit employers try to “mimic” the low benefit employers by offering substantially less 
than the uninformed employers in the symmetric incomplete information treatment. Perhaps, 
they hope that their low wage offers will not cause a strong negative reaction by the workers, 
who cannot tell whether low offers are due to greed or to a low marginal benefit from work  
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effort. But, since the extent of workers’ negative reaction to low wages is not affected by the 
information asymmetry, making low wage offers actually hurts the employers who could have 
earned substantially more by offering higher wages.  
In summary, our experiment gives strong support for the hypothesis that incomplete surplus 
information  is  detrimental  to  trust  and  reciprocity  and  substantially  reduces  payoffs  and 
economic efficiency in relationships with incomplete contracts, such as labor relations with 
non-verifiable  effort.  It  is  very  probable  that  the  negative  impact  of  the  information 
incompleteness  is  due  to  the  fact  that  determining  a  reference  point  for  reciprocity  and 
fairness  in  these  settings  is  difficult.  Things  get  even  worse,  when  there  is  asymmetric 
incomplete information, because the informed side’s attempts to cash in on the information 
advantage are bound to impair trust and reduce market efficiency. In fact, as our experiment 
shows, this negative effect of information asymmetry may make the informed market side 
even worse off than it would be without the information “advantage”. Thus, it seems that 
efficiency  in  markets  that  rely  on  interpersonal  trust  can  be  substantially  enhanced  by 
reducing the uncertainty about the surplus information. Furthermore, we can expect the most 
dramatic positive effects in those cases, in which the informed market side is forced to reveal 
the private payoff information or does so voluntarily to enhance trust and reciprocity. 
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Appendix – Instructions 
Instructions for the labor market experiment 
·  The 20 participants of the experiment are randomly divided into two groups: 10 workers and 10 employers. 
You will be informed at the beginning of the experiment whether you are a worker or an employer. You 
keep your role during the whole experiment. 
·  You play 10 rounds in the situation described below. In each round, one employer and one worker play 
together who did not interact in any previous round and who will not interact with each other in any of the 
following rounds.  
 
Wage 
·  In each round, the employer is given 120 by the experimenter. She can use this amount for paying the wage 
of „her“ worker.  
·  The employer offers to the worker a wage that must lie between 20 and 120. If the employer offers, e.g., a 
wage of 120, than she will keep Zero for herself. If she offers, e.g., a wage of 20, than she will keep 100 for 
herself. 
·  The worker can accept this wage and work for it, or he can reject the wage. 
·  If the worker rejects the wage no contract is concluded. The worker receives an unemployment benefit of 20. 
The employer receives a payoff of Zero, and the round ends for both players.  
·  If the worker accepts the wage a contract is concluded. The worker receives the wage agreed upon and has 
to chose his quantity of work. The employer receives a payoff dependent on the wage agreed upon and the 
quantity of work chosen. 
 
Quantity of work and worker’s income  
·  The quantity of work is characterized by a number between 0.1 and 1.0. The lowest quantity of work is 0.1, 
0.2 is a slightly larger quantity, and 1.0 is the highest quantity of work. 
·  The higher the quantity of work chosen 
® the larger is the employer’s income and 
® the larger are the associated costs for the worker 
 
 
·  The worker’s income can be computed by the employer as well as by the worker in the following way: 
 
Worker’s income = Wage – Costs of the quantity of work chosen 
 
 
––––– The following part is only relevant for the symmetric incomplete information treatment SI. ––––– 
 
Employer profit factor and employer’s income 
·  The employer profit factor (EPF) determines how much profit the quantity of work chosen by the worker 
will create for the employer.  
·  The higher the EPF the more profit the quantity of work creates for the employer. 
·  The EPF does not influence the amount of the worker’s income, however. 
·  The EPF can be either high (1.5) or low (0.5). Both values are equally likely. 
·  The EPF will be randomly drawn at the beginning of each round but will be revealed neither to the employer 
nor the worker. 
quantity of work  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0 
costs for the 
workers 
0  1  2  4  6  8  10  12  15  18  
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·  When making the decisions, the employer’s income cannot be computed exactly because the EPF is not 
known. However, an upper and lower estimate of the employer’s income can be calculated by assuming first 
a high and then a low EPF.  
·  After a round has ended the EPF will be told to both the employer and the worker, and the employer’s 
income will be calculated as follows: 
 
employer’s income  = (120 – wage) x quantity of work x EPF 
 
 
––––– The following part is only relevant for the asymmetric incomplete information treatment ASI. –––– 
 
Employer profit factor and employer’s income 
·  The employer profit factor (EPF) determines how much profit the quantity of work chosen by the worker 
will create for the employer.  
·  The higher the EPF the more profit the quantity of work creates for the employer. 
·  The EPF does not influence the amount of the worker’s income, however. 
·  The EPF can be either high (1.5) or low (0.5). Both values are equally likely. 
·  The EPF will be randomly drawn at the beginning of each round. 
·  The EPF will be revealed to the employer but not to the worker. 
·  The employer’s income can be calculated by the employer as follows: 
 
employer’s income   = (120 – wage) x quantity of work x EPF 
 
·  The worker cannot compute the employer’s income exactly because the EPF is only known to the employer. 
However, the worker can calculate an upper and lower estimate of the employer’s income by assuming first 
a high and then a low EPF.  
 
 




Example  wage offer  accepted?  quantity of work  worker’s income 
EPF = 0.5  EPF = 1.5 
1  110  no  -  20  0  0 
2  110  yes  0.3  108  1.5  4.5 
3  28  no  -  20  0  0 
4  28  yes  0.7  18  32.2  96.6 
 
Total payoff 
·  Your total payoff is the sum over the incomes in all rounds. 
·  Each point gained in the experiment is rewarded with 3 (Euro)Cent.  
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Let’s have an exercise! 
1. Let’s assume that the employer makes a wage offer of 110 to the worker. 
A.  The worker does not accept! What will be the worker’s income and the income of the employer? 
Worker’s income  =  ....................  
Employer’s income  =  ...................  
B. The worker accepts the wage offer and chooses a quantity of work of 0.3! What will be the worker’s 
income and the income of the employer? 
Worker’s income  =  ....................  
B.1. Assume the employer profit factor (EPF) is 0.5! What will be the income of the employer?   
Employer’s income  =  ...................  
 
B.2. Assume the employer profit factor (EPF) is 1.5! What will be the income of the employer?   
Employer’s income  =  ...................  
 
2. Let' s assume that the employer makes a wage offer of 28 to the worker: 
A. The worker does not accept! What will be the worker’s income and the income of the employer?  
Worker’s income  =  ....................  
Employer’s income  =  ...................  
 
B. The worker accepts the wage offer and chooses a quantity of work of 0.7! What will be the worker’s 
income and the income of the employer?  
Worker’s income  =  ....................  
B.1. Assume the EPF is 0.5! What will be the income of the employer?   
Employer’s income  =  ...................  
 
B.2. Assume the EPF is 1.5! What will be the income of the employer?   
Employer’s income  =  ...................  
 